Abstract. This work describes a new approach for behaviour model extraction which combines static and dynamic information. We exploit context information as a way of merging these types of information. Contexts are defined by evaluated control predicates and values of attributes. They create a nested structure that can facilitate the extraction of causal relations between system actions. We show how context information can guide the process of constructing LTS models that are good approximations of the actual behaviour of the systems they describe. These models can be used for automated analysis and property verification. Augmentation of the values of attributes recorded in contexts produces further refined models and leads towards correct models. Completeness of the extracted models depends on the coverage achieved by samples of executions. Our approach is partially automated by a tool called LTSE. Results of one of our case studies are presented and discussed.
Introduction
A behaviour model is an abstract description of how a system should behave that can be used for model checking [4] . The construction of a behaviour model from an existing system to be used in a model checking tool, known as the model construction problem [6] , can be difficult, costly and error-prone [5] . Furthermore, it is essential that two basic requirements be attended. Firstly, the construction of the model must be much simpler and less time-consuming than building the system itself [12] . Consequently, it is desirable that the model be constructed (semi-)automatically. Manual construction of models is usually expensive and likely to introduce errors [6] . Secondly, and most importantly, the model should be a faithful representation of the system behaviour. Any analysis based on an incorrect model may bias the understanding of the system behaviour [14] .
Model extraction is the process of generating a model for an existing system. Our approach for model extraction follows the idea proposed in [8] of combining static and dynamic information. The use of static information for model extraction [6, 13, 11, 2] has demonstrated to be possible to obtain a view of all possible executions of the system. We use control flow information to obtain such a view. As for the dynamic part, we collect trace information, which supplies knowledge about real (therefore feasible) executions and has also been applied to construct models [5, 17, 3] . With this combination of information, we can use the traces to identify feasible behaviours and, based on them, derive other behaviours not included in -or that could not be easily inferred from -them. Such behaviours represent, for instance, alternative paths, which, though not exercised in any particular trace, can be detected by combining traces and identifying, according to the control flow structure, common subsequences of actions in the code.
In order to carry out this combination, we exploit a concept called context. A context is the combination of the execution point in the control flow graph of the system and the system state, represented by values of its attributes. Contexts create a nested structure that can support extracting the causal relation between system actions.
All the information collected is processed by a single tool, called LTS Extractor (LTSE), which implements most of the process we describe here. The created model can be analysed using the LTSA tool [16] . Hence, the effort devoted to the model extraction process is reasonable, requiring only basic knowledge of verification. The user does not need to know the programming language nor the modelling language, as the necessary information is collected automatically through code instrumentation and execution of tests, which produce the traces.
Our models have been used to verify safety and progress properties of singleand multi-threaded systems. As expected, though the analyses using our models have demonstrated that they are good approximations of the behaviours of the systems they describe, completeness of our approach (all traces exhibited by the system are described by the extracted model) depends on the coverage of the test suite that generates trace information. In addition, correctness (all traces exhibited by the model are feasible) depends on the selection of attributes on which contexts are built. However, it can be shown that, by augmenting the context attributes, a refined model that is correct can always be built. This paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the idea of contexts. Section 3 introduces our approach for model extraction in more detail. Section 4 presents some of our experimental results through a case study. In Section 5, we evaluate our approach and discuss related work. Section 6 contains the conclusion and a comment on next steps.
Contexts
In this section we define contexts and exemplify how we exploit the combination of control flow information and trace information. We use the code of a simple text editor as a running toy example. The code for the editor is depicted in Fig. 1 . The code has two attributes: isOpen defines whether a file is open and isSaved indicates whether the file's contents have been saved. In addition, a number of operations that modify these attributes and the text file are provided: open, close, save, edit, exit.
Control flow information.
A control flow graph (CFG) [1] is an abstract representation of a program which models the alternative flows of execution that the program allows. A CFG can be extracted automatically by statically analysing the code and can be used to reason about the code behaviour. Fig. 2 illustrates the control flow graph of constructor Editor() and method edit().
The diamonds define control flow statements (statements that change the normal, sequential control flow of the system, such as lines 9 and 12 in Fig. 1 void e x i t ( S t r i n g n )
Fig. 1. Example Code
A control predicate [20] is a condition associated to a control flow statement. Control predicates can, depending on their evaluation, lead the system to a different path of execution. These alternative paths can be seen in the CFG in Fig. 2 as multiple arrows leaving from the same diamond. The different values of the predicates label the arrows.
The CFG reveals the control predicates that define the system behaviour and which statements and other predicates are dependent on each predicate. However, this static information can include paths that cannot be taken during a real execution. Therefore, some of the paths presented in Fig. 2 , though possible according to the CFG, may not be feasible in the code when it is executed.
The use of symbolic execution [15] can, statically, rule out some infeasible paths. However, if the control flow is dependent on the inputs, an analysis of each case may be necessary. The set of input classes may make it impossible to test all possible cases. Furthermore, symbolic execution usually requires the help of a theorem prover, demanding some expertise from the user.
To fully understand the feasibility of a path of execution we need to know the values of the predicates evaluated along that path. As the values of predicates may change over time during the execution (due to inputs or changes in the system state), some paths that were feasible at certain point may become infeasible later on. For example, the path in the CFG in Fig. 2 allowing method open to be executed is only feasible while no file has been opened for editing. Once a document is opened, that path can never be taken again due to the fact that the value of the control predicate !isOpen becomes false and prevents the call to method open from being reached. If these dynamic changes are not considered, path feasibility can be hard to analyse.
Trace information. Trace information usually gives the sequences of actions executed by the system in the form of traces of execution. A trace is normally a result of a real execution of the system in response to a set of inputs. For Looking at the trace, we can try to infer some relations between the actions and construct a model that approximates the system. In Fig. 3 , we show one possible model, where there is one state per label and, for any pair of consecutive events x, y found in a trace, a transition labelled y from the state denoted by x to that denoted by y exists. Clearly, this inference is not necessarily correct, and, in particular, the model in Fig. 3 allows the sequence open, edit, save, print, save,..., which cannot be exhibited by the system because the second save would never occur as the file has not been edited since the first save.
The procedure we used to construct the model in Fig. 3 is an extremely simplified version of more elaborate approaches to model inference such as [5, 17] . For instance, Cook et al [5] use statistical analysis of patterns in the traces to determine the state space (as opposed to our simplified bijection of events to states). Although these approaches produce models that are good approximations of the system, they suffer from the same problem described above.
Contexts. We now show how, by merging the structural and general knowledge gained from control flow information with the dynamic and specific knowledge obtained from traces, we can ameliorate some of the problems described previously. The basic idea is to use the traces to identify, among all possible paths in the code (represented by its CFG), some feasible paths. Once we know that a path is feasible (i.e., there is a set of inputs and values of predicates that causes the system to exercise it), we can look at the control flow to understand how the trace was generated in the code and possibly infer alternative and recurrent paths based on the control predicates.
Besides sequences of actions, we enrich the trace information including the value of the system state. The system state, in this work, comprises the values of a subset of its attributes. In the case of our example in Fig. 1 , for instance, it would be composed by the values of attributes isOpen and isSaved. Attributes are normally used in control predicates, thus affecting the control flow and, consequently, the traces the system can generate.
Based on this, we have created our concept of contexts. We define a context as the combination of the current point in the system control flow, which is determined by the evaluated control predicates, and the current values of the attributes that define the system state. Therefore, the conjunction of the control flow information and the system state is denominated context information. An example of a context C1 for our running example would be that the execution is on the while-statement in line 9 of Fig. 1 with values of attributes isOpen and isSaved being both false.
A structure of contexts can be naturally defined based on the nested structure of blocks of code in a program. Each context is associated to a block of code by the point of execution that the context represents. For instance, the context C1, mentioned above, can be associated to a block B, representing the code between lines 9 and 24. We say that a context C2 is a subcontext of C1 if the block of code associated to C2 is a sub-block of the block of code associated to C1. Therefore, in our example, the block between lines 11 and 24 (switch-statement) defines a context C2 which is a subcontext of context C1.
Because we also consider the evaluation of predicates and the values of attributes, each block of code can generate multiple contexts, one for each possible combination of the evaluation of the associated predicate and the system state. This means that, for example, the block B cited before could generate various contexts other than C1 depending on the evaluation of its predicate (cmd!=4) and the values of isOpen and isSaved.
The structure of contexts tells us in which conditions (according to the sequence of evaluated predicates, their values and the system state) a context or action is reachable. This is somewhat similar to the idea of path condition [20] , which describes the necessary conditions to be satisfied for the system to execute a path in the code between two given statements.
been successfully used to model and reason about the behaviour of complex systems.
We start off the process by instrumenting the code using a source code transformation language and generating traces based on a test suite. Using the collected information, we identify the necessary context information. This information, combined with the sequences of actions in each context, is used to create an FSP description of the system to be used in the LTSA tool to obtain an LTS model. A general view of the process is presented in Fig. 4 Ellipses represent processing phases and boxes represent inputs/outputs of these processes. Horizontal arrows show the sequence of information processing, whereas vertical arrows describe the inclusion of extra inputs needed during the given process execution. The big block on the right-hand side represents the part of the process automated by our tool. The whole process is described in more detail next. We refer to the code in Fig. 1 to exemplify results from each phase.
Information Gathering
In order to collect the necessary information, we first annotate the Java source codes of some classes of the system and then execute them according to a test suite. The definition of which classes are instrumented depends on the user. They normally involve the classes that produce actions (method calls) included in the properties to be verified. In our example code from Fig. 1 , the existent actions are open, edit, print, save, exit and close.
To carry out the instrumentation, we use the TXL engine [7] to apply modifications to the source code according to a set of rules 1 . We apply domainindependent rules to annotate control flow statements, call sites and methods entry and exit points.
Annotations print out predefined labels (SEL for selection statements, REP for repetition and MET for method blocks) to the standard output along with the values of attributes. If the annotation corresponds to a control flow statement, the annotation also prints the predicate tested and the result of its evaluation. Calls to external methods are also annotated at the call site. Part of the instrumented version of the editor code is shown in Fig. 5 . ca se 0 : S y s t e m . e r r . p r i n t l n ( "SEL_ENTER : ( cmd)#"+c m d+ 11 "#{"+ i s O p e n+" , "+ i s S a v e d+" } " ) ; 12 S y s t e m . e r r . p r i n t l n ( "SEL_ENTER : ( ! isOpen)#"+ 13 ( ! i s O p e n )+ "#{"+ i s O p e n+" , "+ i s S a v e d+" } "
void e x i t ( S t r i n g n ) { 24 S y s t e m . e r r . p r i n t l n ( "MET_ENTER : e x i t #{"+ i s O p e n+" , "+ i s S a v e d+" } " ) ; 25
. . . 26 S y s t e m . e r r . p r i n t l n ( "MET_END" ) ; 27 } 28 . . . 29 }
Fig. 5. Example of instrumented code
Besides the automatically identified actions, we allow the user to define their own actions. We call these user-defined actions, which represent actions other than the execution of a method. This is important in situations where, for example, reaching a given point in the code has some particular meaning, such as the completion of a task, where a task is a set of methods that should be executed in order to realise some specific computation. User-defined actions can be inserted into any part of the code using a predefined format and are automatically converted into the appropriate annotation when the code is instrumented.
The trace generation is done by logging the outputs produced by executing the instrumented code. In order to be able to select the behaviours we want to monitor, we use a test suite. We do not currently use any particular technique for selecting test cases, but all test cases are chosen based on the knowledge we have of the system and to include behaviours we would like to observe. These behaviours are usually related to properties we intend to verify.
The result of executing the instrumented code using the test cases is the creation of a set of logged traces, one for each test case. Part of the log for an execution of the code in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 6 . It includes the beginning of the log, where the first input was the command to open a file, then the file is edited and saved. We used the same sequence of inputs used to obtain the model in Fig. 3 to generate this log file.
Contexts Identification
Using the information in the logs, the LTSE tool constructs a table of contexts for each involved class. A context table (CT) stores information about the contexts created during execution. It is used to keep track of the contexts found in the logs in order to recognise a previously encountered context and identify new contexts. Each new context found (represented by an annotation in the log describing the The result of the context identification phase is the creation of a CT and the generation of a set of context traces for each class of the system. These context traces are sequences of contexts IDs and actions, representing the contexts the system went through during the execution and the actions that happened in each one of them. The LTSE analyses each log separately, looking for context information, updating the CT and including the identified contexts and actions in the context traces. Its basic procedure for each class is as follows:
C o n t e x t C u r r e n t C o n t e x t = I N I T I A L C o n t e x t T a b l e CT is e m p t y / * Context t a b l e * / C o n t e x t S t a c k S is e m p t y / * Stack to c o n t r o l c u rre nt c o n t e x t * / S . p u s h ( C u r r e n t C o n t e x t ) C o n t e x t T r a c e T is e m p t y / * Context t r a c e t o be g e ne r a t e d * / F o r e a c h l o g L c o n t a i n i n g t r a c e s of c l a s s C W h i l e L h a s m o r e a n n o t a t i o n s R e a d a n n o t a t i o n A f r o m L If A . l a b e l == R E P _ E N T E R or S E L _ E N T E R or M E T _ E N T E R N e w C o n t e x t I If ( C u r r e n t C o n t e x t , A ) is in CT / * Already in t a b l e * / I = CT . g e t I d ( C u r r e n t C o n t e x t , A ) / * Get ID * / E l s e I = CT . a d d ( C u r r e n t C o n t e x t , A ) / * Add t o t a b l e * / C u r r e n t C o n t e x t = I S . p u s h ( I ) T . w r i t e ( I ) / * I n s e r t c o n t e x t ID in the c o n t e x t t r a c e * / / * I n s e r t an a c t i o n name in th e c o n t e x t t r a c e * / If A . t y p e == M E T _ E N T E R T . w r i t e ( A . p r e d i c a t e ) E l s e If A . t y p e == R E P _ E N D or S E L _ E N D or M E T _ E N D S . p o p ( ) C u r r e n t C o n t e x t = S . t o p ( )
As an example, Fig. 7 shows part of the CT generated by the LTSE tool based on the log presented in Fig. 6 . The first column contains the context IDs. The ID 0 is reserved for the initial context. An ID 0.1 represents the first subcontext of the initial context, 0.2, the second, and so on. The second column describes the predicate evaluated in the context. No predicate is associated to the initial context and the name of the method is used for contexts representing a method execution. The value of the predicate in the context is presented in the third column. The last column contains the system state, with the first value representing the value of attribute isOpen and the second showing the value of attribute isSaved. Fig. 8 presents, on its left-hand side, part of the contents of the context trace created by the LTSE tool using this CT and the log in Fig. 6 . The context trace is the translation from the annotations in the log to context IDs, in the case of control flow statements, and from annotations to names of actions for methods. Note that, because methods represent the beginning of a new context, they also cause the inclusion of a context ID in the context trace.
FSP Generation
At this stage, the LTSE tool converts the information contained in the context trace into an FSP process definition. Finite State Processes (FSP) [16] is a process algebra for describing LTS models. It allows for local definition (subprocess), action prefix (->), choice (|) and recursion.
In our mapping from context traces to FSP, we create an FSP description to represent the system, where each class for which we have traces is described by a process definition. We create one subprocess definition for each identified context and define the start of a process as the subprocess that represents the initial context. Each subprocess is defined as a number of choices (e.g. of the form
where each choice describes a sequence of actions x j 1 → x j 2 → . . . found contiguously in a context trace between the contexts denoted by P and P j . Implementing this strategy, the LTSE tool constructs the process definition shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 8 for the editor presented in Fig. 1 . This process definition was created based on the contents of the context file presented on the left-hand side of Fig. 8 .
During the mapping, we apply some reductions in order to create a more compact process definition. These reductions involve the merging of contexts into a single subprocess if the contexts appear consecutively in a context trace, i.e., with no actions between them. These simplifications can be seen in Fig. 8 as the dotted boxes on the left-hand side. Their corresponding subprocesses are pointed by the arrows and the actions added to the subprocesses are presented in bold.
The LTS model derived from the FSP description of the editor is generated automatically by the LTSA tool and is depicted in Fig. 9 (state E represents the final state). This model is the result of processing the same trace used to create the inferred model shown in Fig. 3 . Note that the model created using contexts does not include invalid behaviours. Moreover, it does not create any restriction not imposed by the code presented in Fig. 1 . Hence, though it is not complete, as it does not include some feasible behaviours, it is correct with respect to the alphabet of actions chosen. The use of more traces would eventually lead to a complete representation of the editor's behaviour. It is also important to note that this model includes behaviours that were not described in the trace, such as the possibility of repeating the command print on state 1. Actually, the trace did not even include a sequence of two consecutive actions print. This additional behaviour could be inferred because the context trace shows that this action happens inside a loop and that it is always enabled after a file has been opened. For this same reason, print can also be repeated infinitely on state 2, which represents the context where the file has been edited.
Case Study: Cruise Control System
We have validated our approach through a number of case studies involving single-and multi-threaded systems. These case studies include modelling an ATM system, a traffic lights control system and an air conditioner control system. In this paper we report on a cruise control system [16] to demonstrate a practical use of our approach. This case study is a good choice for validation of our approach as both code and model of intended behaviour exist. Hence, we can, compare our automatically generated model to existing ones to evaluate our work. We now present the case study, our analysis results and the discrepancies found between the model we extracted and the existing one.
An automobile cruise control system is controlled by three buttons: on, off and resume. Pressing on when the car engine is working causes the system to record the current speed and keep the car at that speed. The same speed is maintained until the car is accelerated or deaccelerated or off is pressed. If resume is then pressed, the system increases or decreases the speed to set it to the previously recorded speed.
We used the Java implementation of the cruise controller, the Controller class, from [16] . In the system, an object of this class is called from the user interface on events on, off, resume, accelerate, brake, engineOn and engineOff. The object reacts to these method calls by enabling (enableControl), disabling (disableControl) and setting the cruise speed (clearSpeed and recordSpeed) of the speed controller component. The speed controller computes correct throttle values and adjusts throttle according to the desired speed.
Following the approach described in the previous subsection, the code for the Controller class was automatically annotated. We selected the attribute controlState of the class to compose the context information. Then, traces were generated by executing the instrumented code according to the following test cases: T1 = engineOn,accelerate,on,accelerate,resume,brake,resume,off,resume, off,resume,off,engineOff T2 = engineOn,on,accelerate,on,brake,engineOff,engineOn,accelerate,on, off,resume,engineOff T3 = engineOn,accelerate,on,off,resume,off,on,accelerate,on,brake, resume,brake,on,engineOff T4 = engineOn,accelerate,on,engineOff,engineOn,accelerate,brake, accelerate,on,brake,on,off, resume,off,resume,engineOff
Each test case includes the sequences of inputs provided via the system interface. In other words, each label represents clicking on a button of the system GUI. However, there is a one-to-one correspondence between these inputs and method calls, hence the test cases can be thought of as actual method calls on the Controller object. The test cases were chosen based on a desired safety property CRUISESAFETY presented in [16] , which states that the Controller relinquishes control of the speed as soon as the brake, accelerator or off button is pressed.
The generated logs were used as in the LTSE tool to create the FSP description of the Controller. The LTSA tool realised the conversion of the FSP description into its graphical representation as an LTS model, shown in Fig. 10 .
This model is very similar to the one presented in [16] . The only difference is that the automatically extracted model describes traces in which the accelerator may be pressed without turning on the cruise control system. This was a detail omitted in the model in [16] even though it can be exhibited by the implementation taken from the same source. Fortunately, this behaviour does not correspond to a behaviour that violates the safety property, otherwise it would have represented undesired behaviour that would have gone undetected.
For the model checking process, we composed our model of the Controller with those of the other components of the system as they were described in [16] . Even though there was the mentioned difference between our model and the one proposed in [16] , we obtained the same results. As expected, the property CRUISESAFETY was verified not to be violated when the components of the system were composed. Nevertheless, a progress check provided by the LTSA tool showed the problem described in [16] , involving the cruise control system not being disabled when the engine was switched off. Hence, when the car engine was turned back on again, the car would accelerate automatically to the last recorded speed. The error trace obtained with our model in the composition showed exactly the described problem. In this case, the problem was twofold: firstly, the system allowed this dangerous situation to happen; and secondly, the property specification did not include a check of this possible undesired behaviour. To correct this, we applied the necessary corrections to the implementation, to prevent the system from remaining on once the engine was turned off, and to the property specification, to guarantee that this check was now included. These changes resulted in the creation of a model, which, when composed to the other components models, generated no violations during the verification process.
Discussion and Related Work
The completeness of our models depends on the selection of test cases. If sections of the code are never exercised by the test cases, the resulting model will not incorporate all feasible behaviours of the code. An analysis on an incomplete model may generate false positives, i.e., fail to identify violations, which occur when the system executes but do not appear in the model. On the other hand, any violation (of safety properties) found in the model corresponds to a real violation. To ameliorate the incompleteness problem and reduce the possibility of false positives, an adequate test coverage must be achieved. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
Correctness, the fact that all behaviours in the model correspond to feasible executions of the code, depends crucially on the selection of attributes for contexts. If the model is correct (all relevant attributes, according to the property, are chosen), the absence of violations means no violations in the system w.r.t. the traces included in the model and the property being verified. However, if key attributes are not selected, then the model may contain spurious behaviours, which may give rise to false negatives, i.e., examples of violations of properties that cannot occur when running the code.
Detection of false negatives can be done by replaying counterexamples on the code to check if the counterexample is feasible. Confirming infeasibility of a counterexample triggers an augmentation of the attributes selected as part of a context, which in turn will produce, given the same test cases, a model which is a refinement [18] of the model extracted with the smaller set of attributes (i.e., can be simulated by it). Hence, by identifying false negatives, the extracted model can be refined into a correct model of the system, which rules out the false negatives. The issues described above related to correctness correspond to those also addressed in abstraction in program verification (e.g. [11] ). Techniques to support the refinement process are beyond the scope of this paper.
We share the same underlying idea of [19] of putting static and dynamic information together. However, in [19] , the focus is on state properties, such as invariants of attributes of a class, rather than the dynamic behaviour of a component in terms of its required and provided services.
Unlike the FeaVer model extractor [13] , our mapping from the programming language to the verification language is predefined and automatic. Therefore, the user does not need to know the programming nor the modelling language.
As the Bandera toolset [6] , we also direct our model construction by a property to be verified, but the properties we verify do not follow any previously created pattern. Furthermore, we do not use a reduced version of the code to generate models. Rather, we use the complete program to generate the traces and then apply a selective analysis to them according to the actions required to be in the model and the level of abstraction defined by the set of attributes composing the system state.
Verisoft [9] and Java Pathfinder [21] present the possibility of controlling the execution through a custom-made environment to verify all behaviours. Nevertheless, we believe that having a model is useful for a range of purposes other than just verifying properties, such as simulations, animations, performance analysis and model parallel composition to be used, for example, for software evolution.
Whereas modifying the level of abstraction in our work is simple and involves only the selection of additional attributes to be monitored, tools such as SLAM [2] and BLAST [11] use more complex approaches to achieve the appropriate abstraction. They offer techniques for the automatic refinement of abstractions to prove a property. We believe this work is complementary to ours.
Finally, as discussed previously, our work differs from those that take only trace information into account, such as that of Cook & Wolf [5] and Mariani [17] .
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a new approach for automatic model extraction based on the identification of contexts, which has been partially implemented by the LTSE tool. We showed how contexts can be used to combine static and dynamic information. We discussed the results of one of our case studies to show some experimental results. These results indicate that our model extraction process can be used for the construction of LTS models which are good approximations of the real systems and can be used for behaviour analysis and property verification. The appropriate selection of the parameters of the process can lead to a compact and faithful partial representation of the behaviour of the system to be analysed.
Future work includes investigating appropriate test coverage criteria for selecting tests to generate system traces and supporting refinement of context information. In addition, we aim to apply our technique to the model extraction of concurrent and distributed systems. Though we have already developed a few case studies on concurrent systems (e.g., a version of the bounded-buffer described in [10] and the single-lane bridge presented in [16] ), we still need to gain more experience in using our approach for such systems and introduce some necessary extensions.
We have also developed initial case studies using an incremental version of our approach. In this version, a previously created model can be improved by the addition of new traces without requiring the repetition of the whole process from the beginning. Hence, traces obtained through the execution of new test cases could be added to the model. This will permit us to use our work in other areas, such as conformance and software evolution, and enrich the models we generate and augment their accuracy. This idea has been discussed in [17] , but the quantity and quality of the information proved to be insufficient to guarantee good results. In our approach, however, we believe we have enough contextual behavioural information to implement this technique.
